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We examine the impact of different types of social networks on the employment and 
wages of unauthorized and legal Mexican immigrants using data from the Mexican Migration 
Project.  We find that social networks, particularly strong ties, contribute to the economic 
assimilation of immigrants by raising their hourly wages.  However, networks do not enhance 
immigrants’ employability.  Instead, strong ties allow for a lower employment likelihood 
possibly through the shelter against temporary unemployment provided by close family 
members.  Finally, social networks do not alter the relative employment and earnings 










Social networks facilitate immigrants’ assimilation to their host countries.  Public interest 
in immigrants’ integration into their adopting nations has produced a prolific literature that 
examines the role of social networks on a wide variety of aspects of immigrants’ lives, primarily 
their employment and earnings.
1  Despite using very different definitions of social networks, 
previous work on this area has generally found that social networks enhance immigrants’ 
employment opportunities, while not necessarily their earnings.
2  
However, to this date, the literature has not examined the effect of social networks on the 
employment and earnings of legal versus unauthorized immigrants.  This is of special interest in 
the case of unauthorized immigrants, who reached 8.7 million in the U.S. as of the year 2000 
(Census 2000).  Furthermore, there is evidence of immigrants’ unauthorized status adversely 
affecting their employment and earnings in the U.S. (e.g. Bean et al. 1988, Winegarden and Khor 
1991).  Unauthorized immigrants lack appropriate work documentation, increasing their 
difficulty in finding employment and lowering their wages relative to those of legal immigrants 
with proper immigration and work documentation.  In this vein, and focusing on the U.S., 
Rivera-Batiz (1999) finds that male Mexican legal migrants earn, on average, forty-one percent 
more than unauthorized workers.  There is also evidence of immigrants’ legal status explaining 
their earnings and their wage differential with respect to other groups for Italy (Baldacci et. al. 
1999).  Some studies have argued that unauthorized immigrants’ difficulty in finding 
employment and the lower wages they often earn relative to legal immigrants are due to their 
also lower human capital (e.g. Chiswick 1988, Borjas 1990).  However, differences in human 
                                                 
1 Some examples include: Datcher 1983, Granovetter 1995, Chiswick and Miller 1996, Lin 1999, Fafchamps and 
Minten 2002, Rauch 2002, Rauch and Trindale 2002, and Mouw 2003. 
2 E.g. Granovetter 1973 and 1974, Corcoran et al. 1980, Datcher 1983, Montgomery 1992, Chiswick and Miller 
1996, Korenman and Turner 1996, Fernandez et al. 2000, and Calvo-Armengol and Jackson 2002. 2   
capital –such as immigrants’ English proficiency– only explain 48 percent of the log-wage gap 
between unauthorized and legal immigrants (Rivera-Batiz 1999).  Therefore, immigrants’ legal 
status may be affecting their employment and earnings independently of their personal and 
human capital characteristics.  In particular, given their lack of proper work documentation, 
social networks may have a greater impact on unauthorized immigrants (relative to legal 
immigrants) by helping them find employment and/or earn higher wages through a better job 
match.   
In this paper, we examine immigrants’ social networks and the impact of such networks 
on their employment and wages on the basis of their legal status during their last U.S. migration.  
Following Granovetter (1973, 1974, 1982, 1995) and others in the literature (e.g. see Lin 1999), 
we distinguish between strong ties with family members originating from the same household 
back in Mexico, and weak ties with other relatives and friends.  This distinction is of interest 
given the importance of loyalty, solidarity, and reciprocity among immediate household 
members as compared to more distant relatives and friends.  Additionally, the social capital 
available to the migrant through strong and weak ties may also differ.  At last, distinguishing 
between the impact of strong and weak ties on the employment likelihood and hourly wages 
earned by unauthorized and legal immigrants is also of interest due to: (a) the nature of U.S. 
immigration laws, which have traditionally favored family reunification, and (b) the dissimilar 
risk exposure of unauthorized and legal immigrants.   
We use data on Mexican immigrants in the U.S. from the Mexican Migration Project 
(MMP).  Mexican immigrants constitute a particularly interesting immigrant group given that 44 
percent of the unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. are Mexican (Census 2000).  We first find 
that legal immigrants are generally more likely to have larger networks providing both strong 3   
and weak ties than unauthorized immigrants.  The presence of a larger close family network 
could, in part, be due to the nature of U.S. immigration laws.  A larger network of strong ties 
may, in turn, facilitate the acquisition of an extended network of weak ties constituted by family 
friends.   
Additionally, we find that social networks do facilitate the economic assimilation of 
Mexican immigrants by raising their wages.  In particular, the presence of an additional 
household member in the U.S. increases the wages earned by unauthorized immigrants by 3 
percent and those of their legal counterparts by 2.5 percent.  Likewise, each additional distant 
relative or friend providing weak ties raises unauthorized and legal immigrants’ average hourly 
wages by approximately 0.5 percent.  Given unauthorized and legal immigrants’ average 
network size, weak ties improve unauthorized and legal immigrants’ average hourly wages by 
approximately 7.5 percent and 9.5 percent, respectively.  Nevertheless, we do not find evidence 
of social networks improving immigrants’ employment likelihood once in the U.S.  On the 
contrary, the presence of a household member in the U.S. reduces, albeit to a small amount, the 
employment likelihood of immigrants.  We interpret this result as evidence of the temporary 
shelter provided by strong ties, which may enable migrants a longer unemployment period 
during which they can search for a better job match relative to similar migrants lacking such ties.   
Finally, despite their differential impact on unauthorized and legal immigrants’ 
employability, social networks do not alter the already greater employment likelihood exhibited 
by unauthorized relative to legal immigrants, nor the similar average hourly wage earned by 
unauthorized and legal immigrants in the absence of networks.  In this regard, strong and weak 
ties are unable to change the already prevailing employment differences or the similar wages 
earned by the two immigrant groups when they do not network.  4   
  
II.  Background: Social Networks and their Impact on Immigrant Labor Outcomes  
The effect of social networks on immigrants’ employment and wages may significantly 
differ according to how we define social networks.  In this regard, it is first important to point out 
some of the ways in which the existing literature has measured social networks.  For instance, 
Chiswick and Miller (1996) measure social networks by the extent of linguistic concentration in 
the area where the immigrant resides.  Datcher (1983), however, captures the existence of social 
networks with three variables.  The first one is a dummy variable indicative of whether the 
immigrant knew anybody in her current workplace before accepting the job.  The second 
variable is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the immigrant heard about the job from this 
person (or contact).  Finally, a third variable indicates how much influence this person (or 
contact) had in the immigrant’s decision to accept the job.  In a recent paper, Munshi (2003) uses 
data from the MMP to measure social networks as the proportion of individuals in the MMP 
living in the vicinity of the individual in the U.S. and originating from the same community in 
Mexico.  Nonetheless, one of the most influential definitions of social networks is the one 
provided by Granovetter (1973, 1974, 1982, 1995), who distinguishes between strong and weak 
ties.  In particular, he asserts that close friends and family provide us with strong ties, whereas 
acquaintances constitute weak ties.   
The distinction between strong and weak ties is of interest when examining the impact of 
social networks due to the importance of loyalty, solidarity, and reciprocity among family 
members relative to acquaintances.  Consequently, strong and weak ties may exert different 
effort levels when helping migrants find a good job match.  Furthermore, the network social 
capital –that is, the resources, information and influence (as defined by Lin (1999), Mouw 
(2003))– available to the migrant through strong ties may differ from those made available 5   
through weak ties.  As such, it may be reasonable to expect a differential effect from strong ties 
versus weak ties on immigrants’ employment and earnings.   
What have been the major findings in the literature of social networks regarding the 
effect of these networks on the employment and earnings of immigrants?  Despite the different 
measures used in the literature, there are some common findings.  For instance, Granovetter 
(1973, 1974), Fernandez et al. (2000) and Munshi (2003) find that workers have better chances 
of finding employment when using networks.  In particular, they argue that weak ties constituted 
by acquaintances are more effective than strong ties with close friends in part due to the fact that 
acquaintances move in social circles distinct from those of your close friends.  As a result, weak 
ties may offer inside information on alternative job openings.  Similarly, Datcher (1983) finds 
evidence of a positive impact of social networks on employment, although from a different 
perspective.  In particular, Datcher focuses on the impact of informal networks on the probability 
of quitting a job and finds that workers with contacts before being hired are less likely to quit 
their jobs.  Yet another study investigating the effect of social network on employment is the 
analysis by Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004).  By means of their theoretical model, they also 
show that the employment likelihood increases with the extent of social contacts.  
The literature includes a greater diversity of findings when assessing the effect of social 
networks on immigrants’ hourly wages.  For example, Montgomery (1992) finds that weak ties 
can be associated with lower earnings, even though weak ties increase the likelihood of 
employment.  Also while examining immigrants’ earnings, Chiswick and Miller (1996) show 
that there is a tendency among immigrant groups to live in the areas where many others speak 
their language (i.e. areas with a high linguistic concentration).  This tendency, however, appears 
to reduce immigrants’ incentive to learn the new language.  As a result, immigrants living in 6   
areas with higher linguistic concentrations tend to earn less than their counterparts living in areas 
where English is spoken more frequently.  In contrast, Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2002) 
theoretical analysis shows a positive impact of social contacts on wages.  Likewise, Mouw 
(2003) finds that, once we control for unobserved worker characteristics, there is some evidence 
on the use of contacts positively impacting wages.  Finally, using the MMP data, Munshi (2003) 
finds evidence of a higher likelihood of holding a higher paying non-agriculture job among 
migrants with larger networks once the potential endogeneity of social networks with respect to 
employment and earnings is accounted for.   
However, as noted earlier, the literature has not yet addressed networking differences 
between unauthorized and legal immigrants, nor the distinct impact that these networks may 
have on their respective employment and earned wages.  Given the predominance of 
unauthorized Mexican immigrants in the U.S., the aforementioned evidence of immigrants’ 
unauthorized status adversely affecting their employment and earnings, and the nature of U.S. 
immigration laws –which have traditionally allowed for family reunification, we address this gap 
in the literature as follows.   
Inspired on Granovetter (1973, 1974, 1982, 1995) and in order to account for differences 
in the effect of networks according to their composition, we distinguish between immigrants’ 
strong and weak ties.  On the one hand, we measure strong ties by the number of the immigrant’s 
household members back in Mexico residing in the U.S.  On the other hand, weak ties are 
defined as the number of more distant relatives and friends living in the U.S.  In both cases, we 
focus on the size of the strong and weak ties available to the migrant as of the year prior to 
her/his last U.S. trip as a means to guarantee their predetermined character relative to the 
migrant’s employment and earnings outcomes.   7   
We first examine the extent of social networks available to immigrants depending on 
their legal status.  On the one hand, legal immigrants may display larger social networks than 
unauthorized immigrants due to the facilitated family reunification by U.S. immigration laws.  
On the other hand, unauthorized immigrants could maintain more extensive social networks than 
legal immigrants, in particular weak ties with friends, as a means to insure themselves against 
their higher deportation and income risk.  After assessing the extent of immigrants’ weak and 
strong ties according to their legal status, we thoroughly examine the potential impact of such 
ties on the employment and hourly wages of unauthorized and legal immigrants.  Finally, we 
compare the impact of social networks on the employment and hourly wages earned by each 
immigrant group and investigate whether social networks modify or, rather, help perpetuate the 
employment differences or the pay similarity between unauthorized and legal immigrants in the 
absence of social networks.   
 
III.  Theoretical Framework: The Effect of Social Networks on Employment and Wages  
In examining the impact of social networks on unauthorized and legal immigrants’ 
employment and wages, it is useful to make use of a simple model that describes some of the 
ways in which social networks may affect immigrants’ employment and earnings.  The model 
helps us outline the hypotheses we later test within a theoretical framework.  With the 
aforementioned purposes, we use a job-search labor model where immigrants attempt to 
maximize their expected discounted lifetime utility:  





t l y u E β ,    1 0 < < β   
which depends on their income  y  and leisure l, as well as on the discount rate:β .  If employed, 
immigrants choose how many hours to work each period, that is:  ) 1 ( t l −  where  1 0 ≤ ≤ t l , and 8   
receive a wage offer w drawn from the distribution  ) (w F .  As a result, they earn labor incomes: 
) 1 ( * (.) t t l w y − = , where ) n , u ( w w t t = , that is, wages are a function of immigrants’ 
unauthorized status (u ) as well as on their use of social networks (n).  Once employed, 
immigrants are exposed to losing their jobs with probability  ) n , u ( t t ψ ψ = , and unemployed 
immigrants have a probability of finding employment equal to:  ) n , u ( t φ .  We can also allow for 
unemployed immigrants to qualify for unemployment benefits: b .  The collection of 
unemployment insurance may itself depend on immigrants’ legal status, as well as on their social 
networks in the U.S. given their potential role in informing immigrants of their rights to 
unemployment benefits.  Hence:  ( ) n , u b b t t = .  Using V to represent the indirect utility derived 
by immigrants from two state variables: wages (w) and employment (E), the value function of 
employed immigrants can be expressed as:  
(2)  () ( )
e
t t t t t t t t
e
t V E U l y u E w V 1 1 , * (.)) 1 ( * (.) , ) , ( + + − + + = ψ ψ β ,  
where:  () ( ) 1 1 * (.)) 1 ( * (.) . + + − + + = t t
e
t t t t t U V E b U φ φ β  is the value of unemployment.  The value 
function for unemployed immigrants can be expressed as:  
(3)  ()( ) 1 1 1 + + − + + = t
e
t t t t t t
u
t (.))*U φ ( V (.)*E φ β ,l b u (w,E) V t . 
We are interested in empirically assessing the impact of networks (n) on immigrants’ 
employment likelihood (E) and hourly wages (w), both of which depend on  ) n , u ( .
3   With this 
intent, we first examine whether social networks facilitate or, rather, hinder the economic 
assimilation of immigrants through their impact on their employment and earnings, that is, 
whether  ( ) dn
dE En =  > or < 0 and whether  ( ) dn
dw wn =  > or < 0.  Additionally, we ascertain if 9   
social networks have a differential effect on the employment likelihood and hourly wages of 















nu ≠ 0.  In the event that social networks display a differential effect on the 
employment and/or wages earned by unauthorized and legal immigrants, we further explore 
whether strong and weak ties are able to alter the employability or hourly wages earned by 
unauthorized relative to legal immigrants in the absence of networking.         
IV.  Data and Descriptive Evidence on the Use and Role of Social Networks  
We use data from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP).   The MMP database is the 
result from a multidisciplinary study of Mexican-U.S. migration between Universidad de 
Guadalajara and University of Pennsylvania.
4  Currently, the MMP database includes detailed 
social, demographic, and economic information from approximately 16,000 households in 93 
representative communities in 17 Mexican states.
5  The MMP survey has been conducted 
annually in the winter months of 1982-1983 and 1987-2002 in communities of various size, 
ethnic composition, and different levels of economic development that are typical source regions 
for U.S. bound migrants.  Two to five Mexican communities are surveyed each year, with this 
sample expanding over time to incorporate communities in newer sending states.  Approximately 
200 households are randomly selected in each community.  The surveys are given between 
November and February coinciding with the off-season for agriculture work and a time when 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 The impact of social networks on immigrants’ employment and earnings ultimately depends on the assumptions 
we are willing to make about immigrants’ personal and employment characteristics.  Hence, we proceed to examine 
the validity of our hypotheses empirically.  
4 This dataset is publicly available to users at the web at http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/ 
5 As of the MMP93, the sample covers communities in the states of Aguascalientes, Baja California Norte, 
Chihuahua, Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, Nuevo León, Oaxaca, 
Puebla, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, and Zacatecas. 10   
many migrants return to Mexico.  After gathering detailed information on these households, 
interviewers travel to the destination areas in the U.S. to administer identical questionnaires to 
households from the same communities in Mexico who have settled in the U.S. and no longer 
return home.  Altogether, the MMP provides reasonably representative data on authorized and 
unauthorized Mexican immigrants in the U.S.  (Massey and Zenteno 2000) and has been used by 
researchers when examining immigrant networks (e.g. Munshi 2003, Philip and Massey 2003).   
In this project, we use data collected from all household heads (whether or not they ever 
migrated to the U.S.) in the U.S. and Mexico between 1982 through 2003.  In this manner, we 
are able to partially address the selection issues that arise when exclusively focusing on 
immigrants.  Of the approximately 16,000 household heads in the survey, around 6,000 have 
migrated to the U.S. at some point in their lives.  About 85 percent of these U.S. immigrants 
were interviewed in Mexico, with the remaining 15 percent being interviewed in the U.S.
6   
Given our focus on the role of social networks on the employment and wages earned by 
Mexican immigrants according to the closeness of the network ties to the migrant, we follow 
much of the literature on social networks and distinguish between strong and weak ties 
(Granovetter 1973, 1982).  We define strong ties as the number of household members already 
living in the U.S. one year prior to the migrant’s last U.S. trip.  In contrast, weak ties indicate the 
number of more distant relatives and friends residing in the U.S. one year prior to the migrant’s 
last U.S. spell.  Measuring immigrants’ networks as of the year before their last U.S. trip 
guarantees their predetermined nature with respect to immigrants’ employment and wage 
outcomes.   
                                                 
6 While there are no official figures on the proportion of Mexican migrants who never return to Mexico, this 
percentage is suspected to be relatively low due in part to the geographic proximity of the two countries (Lowell 
1992).   11   
In addition, we account for a variety of personal and household characteristics possibly 
affecting individuals’ decision to migrate to the U.S., their likelihood of working during their last 
U.S. trip and, in this last event, their earned wages.  Some of these characteristics include 
household heads’ demographic characteristics, human capital, economic standing, and legal 
status once in the U.S.
7  Additionally, we control for the duration of their U.S. migration and for 
when their last migration took place to account for macroeconomic factors that may have 
affected their employment and wages while in the U.S.   
A detailed description of the variables used in our analysis, as well as their means and 
standard deviations, is included in the Appendix (Table A).  Overall, eighty-seven percent of our 
sample is male.  Approximately 37 percent migrated to the U.S. at some point in their lives, and 
about 98 percent of those who migrated worked, earning an average real hourly wage of $5.31.
8  
Seventeen percent of immigrants had social networks providing weak ties one year prior to their 
last U.S. trip, whereas 10 percent declared having strong ties during the same time period.  On 
average, immigrants with weak ties had 11 relatives and/or friends, whereas immigrants with 
strong ties had about 2 household members residing in the U.S.  Approximately 22 percent of 
immigrants were unauthorized.  Industry-wise, fourteen percent worked in agriculture and 13 
percent in manufacturing.  Finally, the vast majority of our sample migrated during recent 
decades.  In particular, twelve percent of immigrants last came to the U.S. during the 1980s, 
whereas 74 percent last entered the U.S. during the 1990s. 
                                                 
7 Immigrants’ demographic characteristics include their gender, marital status, and presence of children in their 
households.  Immigrants’ human capital is captured by their educational attainment, as well as by their ability to 
speak English, occupation, and cumulative work experience once in the U.S.  At last, immigrants’ economic 
standing is captured by whether they had any land, property, or business assets, as well as whether they were 
employed before migration took place. 
8 Hourly wages are measured in 1982-84 constant dollars.   12   
  Preliminary descriptive evidence of immigrants’ social networks according to their legal 
status can be found in Table 1.  Legal immigrants had larger networks providing both strong and 
weak ties than their unauthorized counterparts.  This result may, in part, be explained by the 
nature of U.S. immigration laws, which have traditionally favored family reunification and, as a 
result, the build up of stronger social networks.   
  Immigrants’ social networks may significantly improve their employment and wage 
outcomes once in the U.S.  We examine this possibility for unauthorized and legal immigrants in 
Table 2 and Table 3.  According to Table 2, the availability of larger than average networks of 
strong or weak ties does not improve unauthorized nor legal immigrants’ employment odds.  
However, as shown by Table 3, accessibility to a larger than usual network of weak ties is 
associated to higher average real hourly wages for both unauthorized and legal immigrants, 
whereas strong ties only raise legal immigrants’ average real hourly wages.   
Finally, we may ask whether the impact of strong and weak ties on immigrants’ 
employability and wages significantly differs across unauthorized and legal immigrants.  The 
figures in Table 4 and Table 5 address this question.  Both tables distinguish legal from 
unauthorized Mexican immigrants.  Larger than usual social networks appear to favor the 
employment of unauthorized, relative to legal, immigrants.  However, immigrants’ social 
networks do not have a differential effect on their labor earnings depending on whether they 
have proper documentation or not.   
  At any rate, much of the effect of social networks on immigrants’ performance during 
their last U.S. trip in Tables 2 through 5 may be due to omitted variable and selection biases.  In 
particular, personal and macroeconomic characteristics we are not accounting for,
9 along with 
the ongoing migration and employment selection (i.e. who chooses to migrate and work in the 13   
U.S.), may be partially responsible for the observed effect of social networks on the employment 
and wages of immigrants.  The analysis in the next sections accounts for these factors.     
V. Methods 
In order to examine the impact of social networks on the employment and wages earned 
by immigrants depending on their legal status during their last trip to the U.S., we carry out our 
empirical estimation in two steps.  First, we investigate the effect of social networks on the 
employment of Mexican immigrants based on their legal status during their last U.S. migration 
experience.  We account for the ongoing selection into migration through the estimation of a 
bivariate probit with sample selection in which respondents first choose whether to migrate to the 
U.S. ( ) M i  and, once they have migrated to the U.S., they decide whether to work or not  ) E ( i .   
Subsequently, we examine the impact of social networks on Mexican immigrants’ wages, 
once more distinguishing according to immigrants’ legal status.  Since we only observe the 
wages of those individuals who choose to migrate and, subsequently, work while in the U.S., we 
account for the dual selection when examining the impact of social networks on immigrants’ 
wages  ) W ( i .
10   
In particular, our model can be described by the following three equations: 
(4)    i i i U X M 1 1 1 ' + = β     Migration  Selection  Rule 
(5)    i i i U X E 2 2 2 ' + = β     Employment  Selection  Rule 
(6)   i i i U X W 3 3 3 3 ' σ β + =     Earnings  Equation 
where  1 D  and  2 D  represent the outcomes from the two-selection rule:  
                                                                                                                                                             
9 Including immigrants’ educational attainment, English fluency, or the economic cycle. 
10 Barham and Boucher (1998) use a similar methodology when examining the effects of migration on the income 

























































A)   Migrants’ Employment Likelihood 
In modeling migration and immigrants’ decision to work once in the U.S., we are 
interested in the first two equations of the model specified above, which we can rewrite as:  
(7)  Migration Selection Rule:  i i i i i Z X M 1 1
'
0 , 1 1 1
'
1 ε χ β ε β + + = + =   




i i Z orks StrongNetw ed Undocument orks StrongNetw
ks WeakNetwor ed Undocument ks WeakNetwor ed Undocument
2 2
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5 , 2 4 , 2
3 , 2 2 , 2 1 , 2 0 , 2
*
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where  ) , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 ( N ~ , 12 i 2 i 1 ρ ε ε and  12 i 2 i 1 ) , ( corr ρ = ε ε .   
Equation (7) models the decision to migrate to the U.S. for the first time.  The vector  i Z1  
includes a variety of demographic and family characteristics typically considered in the literature 
as determinants of the migration decision, such as: gender, age, marital status, family 
composition, number of family members with U.S. migration experience, education, 
employment and assets before first migrating to the U.S. or as of the survey year if they never 
migrated.
11  In addition, the vector  i Z1  includes dummy variables indicating the migrant’s state 
of origin to account for local economic and social conditions possibly affecting the decision to 
migrate.      
                                                 
11 These personal, employment, wealth, and family characteristics have been shown to play a significant role in 
Mexican immigration by previous studies in the literature, such as Greenwood (1975), Durand et. al (1996), 
Lindstrom (1996), and Borjas (1999).   15   
  Immigrants’ last U. S. employment is modeled in equation (8).  Given our interest on the 
role played by social networks on unauthorized and legal immigrants’ employment outcomes, we 
include a dichotomous variable indicative of immigrants’ legal status along with information on 
the size of immigrants’ weak and strong ties one year prior to their last U.S. trip.  We then create 
a series of interaction terms between immigrants’ legal status and their availability of weak and 
strong ties to assess the differential impact of these social networks on immigrants’ employment 
according to their legal status during their last U.S. trip.   
In the networking literature, several studies have pointed out the potential endogeneity of 
social networks with respect to employment and earnings (e.g. Mouw 2003 and Munshi 2003).  
The potential for such endogeneity emerges from two sources.  First, unobserved individual 
characteristics and other omitted variables possibly affecting immigrants’ employment and 
earnings are likely to be correlated with regressors included in the employment and earnings 
equations, such as educational attainment.  Under such circumstances, our estimates of the effect 
of social networks on immigrants’ employability and earnings are likely to be affected by 
omitted variable biases.  Secondly, immigrants’ networking and employment outcomes once in 
the U.S. are likely to be jointly determined, leading to reverse causality.  In order to address 
these issues, we proceed as follows.  Given the cross-sectional nature of the MMP,
12 we model 
the migration decision in an attempt to account for some of the unobserved immigrant 
characteristics possibly driving their employment and wage performance once in the U.S.
13  
                                                 
12 At this juncture, it is worth noting that despite collecting some retrospective information from the household head 
and the spouse, the MMP is cross-sectional in nature.   
13 In a related study, Munshi (2003) measures networks by the proportion of the sampled individuals originating 
from the migrant’s community in Mexico and living in the migrant’s vicinity in the U.S. also using data from the 
MMP.  To the extent that this measure is contemporaneous to the migrant’s U.S. employment experience, there is a 
potential for simultaneity between immigrants’ networks and employment outcomes.  Furthermore, Munshi does not 
model the migration decision; thus, his emphasis on the need to correct for the endogeneity bias contaminating the 
estimated effects of social networks on the migrant’s employment and earnings.  This endogeneity bias emerges 
from the potential for unobserved labor shocks driving Mexican migration to the U.S. to also affect the migrant’s 16   
Subsequently, we measure immigrants’ networks as of the year before their last U.S. trip so as to 
guarantee the predetermined nature of these networks with respect to immigrants’ employment 
and wage outcomes during their last U.S. spell.     
In addition to immigrants’ social networks, equation (8) includes the vector  i Z2 , which 
contains information on a variety of variables known to affect the likelihood of being employed, 
from respondents’ demographic characteristics (e.g. gender, age, marital status, and number of 
dependents), to their educational attainment, ability to speak English, and wealth (as captured by 
their assets).  Additionally,  i Z2  incorporates information on the duration (in months) of 
migrants’ last U.S. experience since the longer the period they have stayed in the U.S., the 
greater the specific U.S. human capital that they may have acquired.  A series of dichotomous 
variables indicating when the last migration took place to capture the different macroeconomic 
conditions that may have affected immigrants’ employment outcomes are also included in i Z2 .  
At last, the vector i Z2  includes a set of dummy variables indicative of the U.S. state where 
migrants were last employed in order to account for different labor market conditions possibly 
affecting their employment likelihood.   
  Note that we are interested in Mexicans who chose to migrate to the U.S. at some point in 
their lifetimes (i.e.  ) 1 1 = D and worked during their last U.S. trip (i.e.  ) 1 2 = D .  We can write the 
probability of this joint event () P  as: 




1 1 , X U X U β β − > − > ]=G( 12 2 1 , C , C ρ ), 
                                                                                                                                                             
employment and earnings in the U.S. through their impact on the size of the social network available to the migrant.                  
In our analysis, we avoid these potential sources of endogeneity by: (a) defining immigrants’ networks by the size of 
the strong and weak ties available to the migrant as of the year prior to her/his last U.S. trip as a means to guarantee 
their predetermined character relative to the migrant’s employment and earnings outcomes; and (b) by explicitly 
modeling the migration decision and accounting for local economic and social conditions (including labor shocks) 
possibly affecting the decision to migrate through a set of dummy variables indicative of the state of origin of the 





1 1 , X C X C β β = = , G(.) is the bivariate normal density function, and  12 ρ  is the 
correlation coefficient.  Hence, the likelihood function for the bivariate probit with selection 
specified in equations (7)-(8) is given by:  
(10)  ) ' ( ) , ' , ( ) , ' , ' ( 1
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where the first term of the likelihood function corresponds to working migrants, the second term 
to non-working migrants, and the third term to non-migrants.  The bivariate probit is identified 
through the use of regressors specific to the time when the first migration took place as 
determinants of the decision to migrate, and through the use of regressors specific to the last trip 
to the U.S. to which the employment questions in the MMP survey are referred.  
B)   Migrants’ Earnings 
  In assessing the potential impact of social networks on immigrants’ earnings, it is 
important to note that wages are only observed for working migrants (i.e. individuals with  1 1 = D  
and 1 2 = D , or P = 1).  Therefore, going back to the model specified by equations (4)-(6), we can 
write expected wages as:  
(12)   | ( i W E 2 2 2 1 1 1 ' , ' X U X U β β − > − > ) =  ) , | ( ' 2 2 1 1 3 3 3 3 C U C U U E X − > − > +σ β , 
where  3 σ  is a normalization factor or scaling factor.   
  Following Tunali (1985), and given the trivariate normal specification of  , , 2 1 U U and  3 U , 
we can specify the expected value of  3 U as: 
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where f(.) and F(.) are the standard univariate normal density and distribution function, 
respectively, P  is given by equation (9), 
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Substituting equation (13) in (12), we obtain the expression for the expected wages of 
working migrants:  
(14) | ( i W E 2 2 2 1 1 1 ' , ' X U X U β β − > − > ) = 1 3 3 ' γ β + X 2 2 1 λ γ λ + ,  
where  13 3 1 ρ σ γ = , and  23 3 2 ρ σ γ = .  Using the consistent estimates of  , , 2 1 β β and  12 ρ  obtained 
from the maximum likelihood estimation of equation (10), we construct  1 λ  and  2 λ  for each 
migrant and rewrite the selection corrected wage equation as: 
(15)   3 3 2 2 1 1 3 3 ' V X Wi σ λ γ λ γ β + + + = = 
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where: 0 ) 1 , 1 | ( 2 1 3 = = = D D V E .  In addition to the sample selection correction terms, equation 
(15) includes the vector  i Z3  with variables known to affect immigrants’ earnings, such as 
immigrants’ gender, age, educational attainment, English speaking ability, cumulative work 
experience in the U.S., duration of their U.S. trip, and the specific time period when such trip 
took place.
14  Likewise, the vector  i Z3  includes a set of dummy variables indicative of the U.S. 
states where immigrants located to account for special labor market conditions possibly affecting 
their wages.  Equation (15) is estimated by OLS.  The variance-covariance matrix is computed 
following Tunali (1985).   
                                                 
14 See, for example, Philips and Massey (1999). 19   
VI.  Results: Social Networking and Its Impact on Immigrants’ Employment and Wages 
  Table 6 displays the results from estimating the likelihood that immigrants worked during 
their last U.S. migration while accounting for the selection incurred when focusing on 
immigrants.  As noted earlier, the model is appropriately identified through the use of a variety 
of regressors referred to respondents’ first U.S. migration when examining their likelihood to 
migrate to the U.S.,
15 and through the use of other regressors referred to immigrants’ last U.S. 
migration when examining their employment likelihood.
16  Additionally, we report the 
likelihood-ratio test for the independence of the migration and the employment equations at the 
bottom of Table 6.  This test examines whether  0 12 = ρ  and, therefore, compares the results from 
estimating the migration and the employment equations separately versus jointly.  As indicated 
by the likelihood ratio test, the joint estimation of our two-equation bivariate probit specification 
is recommended.   
Since our focus is exclusively on immigrants, we need to account for the sample selection 
we may incur when restricting our analysis to this group.  We do so by first modeling the 
decision to migrate in the bottom panel of Table 6.  As noted earlier, the migration equation 
includes a set of dummies for the Mexican states where migrants originate from so as to account 
for a variety of social and economic conditions potentially influencing their migration decision.  
Overall, the results in the bottom panel of Table 6 generally confirm previous findings in the 
migration literature.  For instance, since the vast majority of Mexican immigrants in our sample 
are male, it is not surprising to find that men are 11 percentage points more likely to migrate than 
women.  Similarly, younger household heads with more time to recoup the returns to their 
migration are more likely to migrate than their older counterparts.  Additional demographic 
                                                 
15 For those who never migrated to the U.S., this information is referred to the survey date.   
16 The MMP only collects detailed information on the job held by Mexican immigrants during their last U.S. trip.   20   
characteristics influencing the migration decision include marital status and the number of non-
working age dependents.  In particular, single household heads and those with fewer dependents 
are more mobile than their married counterparts and other household heads with more 
dependents.   
While respondents are not asked about networks in the U.S. unless they declare having 
emigrated to the U.S. at some point in their lifetimes, we do have information regarding the 
number of household members with a U.S. migration history.  Not surprisingly, the presence of 
an additional household member with such a migration experience increases the respondent’s 
migration likelihood by 3 percentage points.  In contrast, having an additional dependent lowers 
the respondent’s migration likelihood by 1 percentage point.  Additionally, the results indicate 
that less educated Mexican household heads are more likely to migrate than their more educated 
counterparts.  Specifically, each additional year of education lowers the likelihood of migration 
by approximately 3 percentage points.  Lastly, migration seems to be linked to immigrants’ 
employment status and asset ownership prior to departure.  In particular, employed household 
heads are approximately 25 percentage points less likely to migrate than their unemployed or 
inactive counterparts.  Likewise, household heads owning houses, land, businesses or similar 
properties prior to migration are about 26 percentage points less likely to migrate than non-
proprietors.   
A)  Immigrants’ Employment by Legal Status and Network Use 
The top panel of Table 6 shows the determinants of the decision to work among Mexican 
immigrant household heads during their last U.S. trip.  As when modeling migration, the analysis 
includes as set of dummy variables representing the state where the respondent last migrated to 
so as to account for regional economic conditions potentially affecting their employment 21   
likelihood.  Of special interest to our analysis is the role played by social networks on 
immigrants’ employment according to their legal status.  Hence, we first examine unauthorized 
immigrants’ performance relative to legal immigrants’ performance in the absence of social 
networking.  Under such circumstances, unauthorized immigrants display a 2-percentage point 
greater likelihood of having worked during their last U.S. trip than their legal counterparts.  The 
difference may simply reflect the fact that unauthorized immigrants are more likely to have 
crossed to the U.S. with the exclusive purpose of working than their legal counterparts.   
How does this percentage change with the use of strong and weak ties?  Unlike the 
previous literature, we find that social networks do not improve the employment likelihood of 
immigrants.  In fact, strong ties constituted by household members residing in the U.S. seem to 
allow for a slightly lower (each member reduces the employment likelihood by less than 1 
percentage point) employment likelihood on the part of migrants.  The possibility exists that the 
presence of close family members in the U.S. allows migrants for a longer job search period, a 
non-existent opportunity when those strong ties are not available.  At any rate, with the intent of 
facilitating the evaluation of any social networks’ employment or wage effects, we compare their 
impact within groups of unauthorized and legal immigrants as well as across both groups in 
Table 8.  First, the figures in the first row of Panel A and Panel B reveal that social networks 
constituted by distant relatives and friends do not significantly change the employment 
likelihood of neither unauthorized nor legal immigrants once we account for the ongoing 
migration selectivity.     
Second, the figures in the second row of Panel A and Panel B suggest that strong ties 
allow immigrants to extend their unemployment status, may be through a longer job search 
period, relative to other immigrants lacking the shelter provided by close family members.  22   
Nonetheless, this effect is relatively small, always below 1 percentage point for both 
unauthorized and legal immigrants.   
Third, Panel C explores potential differences in the impact of social networks on the 
employment likelihood of unauthorized versus legal immigrants.  As suggested by the summary 
statistics in Table 4, social networks seem to favor the employment of unauthorized immigrants 
over the employment of their legal counterparts.  However, social networks’ differential impact 
on immigrants’ employability is not large enough to substantially change the 2 percentage point 
higher likelihood of being employed displayed by unauthorized immigrants relative to their legal 
counterparts in the absence of networks.       
Finally, we return to the figures in Table 6 to discuss other determinants of immigrants’ 
employment during their last U.S. trip.  As in the case of migration, the results from estimating 
the likelihood of having worked during their last U.S. trip for immigrant household heads are in 
line with findings from the labor supply literature.  Focusing first on immigrants’ personal 
characteristics, men and younger household heads, who typically display higher labor force 
participation rates, also appear more likely to have worked during their last U.S. trip than women 
and older immigrants.  Additionally, Mexican immigrants with dependents appear more likely to 
be employed than their counterparts without dependents as of their last time in the U.S.  In 
particular, each additional dependent increases the probability of employment among immigrants 
by approximately 1percentage point.  Lastly, the employment likelihood of immigrants may be 
potentially influenced by other migrant cohort characteristics as reflected by the fact that 
immigrants who last came to the U.S. in the 1950s were significantly more likely to have worked 
during their last U.S. migration than their more recent counterparts in the 1990s.   23   
B)  Immigrants’ Hourly Wages by Legal Status and Network Use 
Do strong and weak ties have any discernable impact on unauthorized and legal 
immigrants’ hourly wages?  The figures in Table 7 address this question with the estimated 
effects of social networks on the log real hourly wages earned by Mexican immigrants employed 
during their last U.S. visit.  The estimation accounts for any potential biases resulting from the 
ongoing migration and work selection.  Specifically, the sample selection correction term 
accounting for the migration selection is negative and statistically different from zero.  The sign 
on the bias correction term for the ongoing migration selection reveals that Mexicans unable to 
migrate to the U.S. would have earned lower wages in the U.S. market than their migrating 
counterparts.  In contrast, the sample selection correction term accounting for the selection of 
migrants into work is positive and indicative of the higher reservation wage of those migrants 
who choose not to work relative to their working counterparts.  Nonetheless, since the majority 
of migrants do work once in the U.S. (approximately 94 percent of migrants in our sample), the 
correction term for the ongoing selection of migrants into employment is not statistically 
different from zero.  Finally, as with the modeling of migrants’ employment outcomes during 
their last U.S. migration, the analysis includes as set of dummy variables representing the U.S. 
state where the respondent last migrated to so as to account for regional economic conditions 
possibly affecting their earned wages.     
Focusing on the variables of interest to the present study, we find that social networks 
improve the average hourly wages of immigrants regardless of their legal status.  To facilitate a 
further comparison of the impact of different types of social networks on unauthorized and legal 
immigrants’ wages, we refer to the figures in Table 8.  First of all, and unlike for employment, 
social networks positively affect the wages earned by unauthorized and legal immigrants (see 24   
Panel A and Panel B).  Indeed, the presence of an additional household member in the U.S. –a 
source of strong ties— raises unauthorized and legal immigrants’ average real hourly wages by 3 
percent and by 2.5 percent, respectively.  Weak ties also help improve immigrants’ labor 
earnings, raising average real hourly wages by approximately 0.5 percent with each additional 
relative or friend added to the network.  While this may seem a relatively small effect, it is worth 
remembering that the average social network providing weak ties to unauthorized immigrants 
consists of 15 members (see Table 1).  Likewise, legal immigrants have an average of 19 
individuals providing weak ties.  Therefore, weak ties improve unauthorized and legal 
immigrants’ hourly wages by an average of 7.5 percent and 9.5 percent, respectively.   
However, as revealed by the figures in Table 5, social networks do not seem to have a 
differential impact on the hourly wages earned by unauthorized relative to legal immigrants.  As 
can be seen from Panel C, similar unauthorized and legal immigrants earn comparable wages 
regardless of their social networks.      
Finally, the remaining figures in Table 7 confirm those of the literature on immigrants’ 
earnings.  Men and younger migrants, possibly due to gender differences and, in the case of 
younger migrants, to their easier assimilation to their host country, earn significantly more than 
women and older migrants.  Furthermore, as hypothesized in the labor economics literature, 
immigrants’ human capital –as captured by their educational attainment, ability to speak English, 
accumulated U.S. work experience, and time in the U.S., increases their wages.  In particular, 
each additional year of education raises immigrants’ wages by 2 percent.  Likewise, Mexican 
immigrants who speak English earn approximately 18 percent more than their employed 
counterparts unable to speak the language.  We also find that immigrants’ occupation during 
their last U.S. trip (a proxy for skill) affects their wages.  In particular, immigrants in either more 25   
skilled positions –such as professional and technical occupations, or in typically unionized jobs –
as is often the case in manufacturing, earn between 19 percent and 27 percent higher wages than 
their counterparts in the service sector.  Finally, immigrants who last migrated during the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s earned relatively higher wages than similar immigrants who came before the 
1990s.  This was particularly the case for immigrants last arriving during the 1960s and 1970s, 
who earned up to 24 percent and 29 percent more, respectively.  This wage gap closed following 
the overall deterioration of real wages during the 1980s, when the wage differential declined to 
approximately 5 percent.   
 
VII.  Summary and Conclusions 
  The new economics of labor migration emphasizes the importance of risk diversification 
in understanding international migration (Stark and Bloom 1985, Gubert 2002).  One of the ways 
in which migrants accomplish this objective is by diversifying family income with earnings from 
a job held abroad.  It is in this respect that social networks –defined as immigrants’ ties with 
family and friendship– become instrumental.  Social networks have been known to facilitate the 
economic and social assimilation of immigrants to their host country through the provision of a 
safety net and contacts useful in finding employment, as well as social support (Granovetter 
1995 and Lin 1999).  This support is likely to be crucial among unauthorized immigrants, who 
are exposed to a greater deportation and income risk.  Despite the magnitude of Mexican 
unauthorized migration in the U.S. and the various reasons as for why unauthorized and legal 
immigrants’ social networks may differ in nature, size, and effectiveness in improving 
immigrants’ employability and earnings, the literature has not looked into differences in the size 
and role of social networks in facilitating unauthorized versus legal immigrants’ economic 
assimilation.    26   
In this paper, we address this gap in the literature with: (1) a descriptive analysis of social 
networks available to unauthorized and legal Mexican immigrants in the U.S., and (2) an 
econometric study of the potentially distinct effect of these networks on their employment and 
earned wages during their last U.S. migration.   
Using data from the Mexican Migration Project, we follow the tradition established by 
Granovetter (1973, 1974, 1982, 1995), among others, and distinguish between strong ties 
constituted by close family members and weak ties composed of distant relatives and friends.  
Several results are worth discussing.  First, we find that legal immigrants maintain significantly 
larger social networks offering strong and weak ties than unauthorized immigrants.  The larger 
size of social networks available to legal immigrants may be partially due to the nature of U.S. 
immigration, which favors family reunification.  This finding further emphasizes the importance 
of distinguishing according to immigrants’ legal status when examining the role of social 
networks on immigrants’ employment likelihood and labor earnings.     
Second, we examine the role played by strong and weak ties on the employment and 
wages of both legal and unauthorized immigrants.  We confirm some of the findings in the 
literature of social networks, such as the fact that social networks raise immigrants’ wages (e.g. 
Calvo-Armengol and Jackson 2002, Mouw 2003, and Munshi 2003).  Specifically, the presence 
of an additional household member in the U.S. raises immigrants’ wages by as much as 3 percent 
in the case of unauthorized immigrants and by 2.5 percent in the case of legal immigrants.  The 
impact of each additional distant relative or friend providing weak ties is, however, lower; 
improving unauthorized and legal immigrants’ average hourly wages by 0.5 percent.  
Nonetheless, given the average size of unauthorized and legal immigrants’ social networks, the 
results suggest that weak ties end up raising unauthorized and legal immigrants’ hourly wages by 27   
an average of 7.5 percent and 9.5 percent, respectively.  At any rate, we do not find evidence of 
social networks improving immigrants’ employment likelihood once in the U.S.  In fact, the 
presence of a household member in the U.S. reduces, albeit to a small amount (0.5 percentage 
points among unauthorized immigrants and 0.7 percentage points among legal immigrants), the 
employment likelihood of immigrants.  We interpret this result as evidence of the temporary 
shelter provided by household members, which may enable unemployed migrants a longer job 
search period.   
Finally, social networks only seem to have a differential impact on the employment 
likelihood of unauthorized immigrants relative to legal immigrants.  However, their differential 
impact is not large enough to significantly alter the sign or magnitude of the employment gap 
between the two immigrant groups in the absence of social networks.  In particular, unauthorized 
immigrants continue to display a 2 to 3 percentage point higher likelihood of being employed 
relative to similar legal counterparts regardless of whether they both lack or have weak and/or 
strong ties.  Similarly, the availability of a larger network of close family members, distant 
relatives, and/or friends does not modify the similar average real hourly wage earned by alike 
unauthorized and legal immigrants in the absence of networks.   
Overall, the results emphasize the important role of social networks in providing a 
temporary shelter against unemployment.  Additionally, possibly through a better job match 
product of an extended job search, social networks play an important role in facilitating the 
economic assimilation of Mexican immigrants by means of a higher hourly wage.  In this 
manner, social networks provide immigrants with needed insurance against the risk involved in 
their migration experience.  As such, social networks become instrumental in the risk 
diversification strategy possibly motivating their international migration.  This form of ‘private’ 28   
insurance provided by social networks, which could be strengthened (lessened) through 
immigration laws favoring (restricting) family reunification, substitutes other types of ‘public’ 
insurance (e.g. government assistance programs) that could otherwise be provided by the State.   
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Table 1 
Average Size of Mexican Immigrants’ Social Networks Offering Weak and Strong Ties by Their Legal Status 
 
Variables  Mean  Standard Error  Dif in Means
a  t-statistic 
Weak ties: 
Unauthorized Immigrants  15.3565  0.3365  -   
Legal Immigrants  19.0740  0.4897  3.7174  6.2560*** 
Strong ties : 
Unauthorized Immigrants  0.6264  0.0250  -   
Legal Immigrants  0.8050  0.0320  0.1786  4.3958*** 
Notes:  
a Differences in mean relative to the first category in the grouping.  We test the hypothesis: Dif ≠ 0, i.e. that 
the size of social networks available to unauthorized and legal immigrants is significantly different.  *** Signifies 
statistically different from zero at the 1% level or better, **signifies statistically different from zero at the 5% level 
or better and *signifies statistically different from zero at the 10% level or better. 
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Table 2 
Average Proportion Of Employed Mexican Unauthorized and Legal Immigrants According to  
Their Larger than Average Social Network of Weak and Strong Ties  
 
Variables  Proportion  S.E.  Dif in Means
a  t-statistic 
Unauthorized Immigrants : 
With Greater than Average Weak Ties  0.9574  0.0060  -  - 
Without Greater than Average Weak Ties  0.9578  0.0041  0.0004  0.0552 
With Greater than Average Strong ties  0.9444  0.0077  -  - 
Without Greater than Average Strong Ties  0.9622  0.0038  0.0178  2.0749 
Legal Immigrants: 
With Greater than Average Weak Ties  0.9358  0.0079  -  - 
Without Greater than Average Weak Ties  0.9251  0.0068  -0.0107  -1.0299 
With Greater than Average Strong ties  0.9074  0.0103  -  - 
Without Greater than Average Strong Ties  0.9396  0.0058  0.0323  2.7201 
Notes:  
a Differences in mean relative to the first category in the grouping.  We test the hypothesis: Dif < 0, i.e. that 
an above average availability of social networks increases the employment likelihood of immigrants.  *** Signifies 
statistically different from zero at the 1% level or better, **signifies statistically different from zero at the 5% level 
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Table 3 
Average Real Hourly Wages of Mexican Unauthorized and Legal Immigrants According to  
Their Greater than Average Social Network of Weak and Strong Ties  
 
Variables  Mean  S.E.  Dif in Means
a  t-statistic 
Unauthorized Immigrants : 
With Greater than Average Weak Ties  7.0042  0.9524  -  - 
Without Greater than Average Weak Ties  5.2953  0.2772  -1.7089  -1.7229** 
With Greater than Average Strong ties  6.0338  0.3682  -  - 
Without Greater than Average Strong Ties  5.8677  0.5070  -0.1661  -0.2651 
Legal Immigrants: 
With Greater than Average Weak Ties  7.4447  0.2086  -  - 
Without Greater than Average Weak Ties  5.0317  0.2431  -2.4130  -7.5328*** 
With Greater than Average Strong ties  6.5768  0.3732  -  - 
Without Greater than Average Strong Ties  5.8500  0.1698  -0.7268  -1.7726** 
Notes:  
a Differences in mean relative to the first category in the grouping.  We test the hypothesis: Dif < 0, i.e. that 
an above average availability of social networks increases immigrants’ wages.  *** Signifies statistically different 
from zero at the 1% level or better, **signifies statistically different from zero at the 5% level or better and 
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Table 4 
Differences in the Average Proportion of Employed Mexican Unauthorized Immigrants versus Legal Immigrants  
According to Their Greater than Average Social Network of Weak and Strong Ties  
 
Variables  Proportion  S.E.  Dif in Means
a  t-statistic 
Smaller than Average Weak and Strong Ties: 
Legal Immigrants  0.9342  0.0078  -  - 
Unauthorized Immigrants  0.9625  0.0045  -0.0282  -3.1458 
Greater than Average Weak Ties: 
Legal Immigrants  0.9358  0.0079  -  - 
Unauthorized Immigrants  0.9574  0.0060  -0.0216  -2.1760** 
Greater than Average Strong Ties: 
Legal Immigrants  0.9074  0.0103  -  - 
Unauthorized Immigrants  0.9444  0.0077  -0.0370  -2.8691*** 
Greater than Average Weak and Strong Ties: 
Legal Immigrants  0.9103  0.0162  -  - 
Unauthorized Immigrants  0.9477  0.0120  -0.0374  -1.8542** 
Notes:  
a Differences in mean relative to the first category in the grouping.  We first test the hypothesis that: Dif > 0, 
i.e. that the employment likelihood of legal immigrants is higher than that of their unauthorized counterparts when 
they both have smaller than average weak and strong ties.  The corresponding hypothesis being tested when 
immigrants have greater than average social ties (of any kind or of both types) is that: Dif < 0, i.e. that the 
employment likelihood of legal immigrants with greater than average social ties (of any type or of both types) will 
be lower than that of unauthorized immigrants with similar ties.  *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 
1% level or better, **signifies statistically different from zero at the 5% level or better and *signifies statistically 
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Table 5 
Differences in the Average Real Hourly Wages of Mexican Unauthorized Immigrants versus Legal Immigrants  
According to Their Greater than Average Social Network of Weak and Strong Ties  
 
Variables  Mean  S.E.  Dif in Means
a  t-statistic 
Smaller than Average Weak and Strong Ties: 
Legal Immigrants  4.7951  0.2249  -  - 
Unauthorized Immigrants  5.1334  0.3144  -0.3383  -0.8753 
Greater than Average Weak Ties: 
Legal Immigrants  7.4447  0.2086  -  - 
Unauthorized  Immigrants  7.0042 0.9524 0.4405 0.4518 
Greater than Average Strong Ties: 
Legal Immigrants  6.5768  0.3732  -  - 
Unauthorized  Immigrants  6.0338 0.3682 0.5430 1.0358 
Greater than Average Weak and Strong Ties: 
Legal Immigrants  8.0009  0.3840  -  - 
Unauthorized  Immigrants  6.3707 0.3056 1.6302 3.3220 
Notes:  
a Differences in mean relative to the first category in the grouping.  We test the hypothesis: Dif > 0, i.e. that 
the average real hourly wages earned by legal immigrants are higher than that of their unauthorized counterparts 
when they both have smaller than average weak and strong ties.  The corresponding hypothesis being tested when 
immigrants have greater than average social ties (of any kind or of both types) is that the Dif < 0, i.e. that the 
average real hourly wage earned by legal immigrants with greater than average social ties (of any type or of both 
types) will be lower than that of unauthorized immigrants with similar ties.  *** Signifies statistically different from 
zero at the 1% level or better, **signifies statistically different from zero at the 5% level or better and *signifies 
statistically different from zero at the 10% level or better. 
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Table 6 
Bivariate Probit of the Likelihood for Migrating to the U.S. and Working During Their Last U.S. Trip 
 
Variables Coefficient  Robust S.E.  Marginal Effect 
Worked During Last U.S. Migration       
Unauthorized During Last U.S. Migration  0.2527***  0.0885  0.0239 
Weak ties During Last U.S. Migration  0.0015 0.0021  0.0002 
Unauthorized*Weak ties  -0.0028 0.0029  -0.0003 
Strong ties During Last U.S. Migration  -0.0642*** 0.0244  -0.0068 
Unauthorized*Strong ties  0.0195 0.0345  0.0021 
Male  1.1288*** 0.0945  0.2200 
Age at Last U.S. Migration  -0.0133*** 0.0032  -0.0014 
Married at Last U.S. Migration  0.1455 0.1617  0.0137 
Dependents at Last U.S. Migration  0.1070*** 0.0163  0.0113 
Years of Education at Last U.S. Migration  -0.0058 0.0092  -0.0006 
Spoke English at Last U.S. Migration  0.0740 0.0802  0.0074 
Owned Any Assets Before Last U.S. Migration  0.0841 0.0732  0.0085 
Duration of Last Trip to the U.S.  0.0007 0.0005  0.0001 
Last Migrated to the U.S. Before 1940  -0.2845 0.3806  -0.0377 
Last Migrated to the U.S. During the 1940s  -0.0475 0.1943  -0.0052 
Last Migrated to the U.S. During the 1950s  0.4755*** 0.1722  0.0348 
Last Migrated to the U.S. During the 1960s  0.1815 0.1290  0.0167 
Last Migrated to the U.S. During the 1970s  -0.0614 0.0941  -0.0068 
Last Migrated to the U.S. During the 1980s  0.0990 0.0770  0.0098 
Migrated to the U.S.       
Male 0.3607***  0.0523  0.1086 
Age at First Migration or at Survey Date  -0.0775*** 0.0015  -0.0256 
Married at First Migration or at Survey Date  -0.7813*** 0.0596  -0.1968 
Dependents at First Migration or at Survey Date  -0.0236*** 0.0071  -0.0078 
Number of Family Members with U.S. Migration Experience  0.0910*** 0.0108  0.0301 
Years of Education at First Migration or at Survey Date  -0.1004*** 0.0037  -0.0332 
Employed Before First Migration or at Survey Date  -0.6942*** 0.0560  -0.2540 
Owned Any Assets Before First Migration or at Survey Date  -0.7568*** 0.0316  -0.2586 
Regression Fit Statistics   
Number of Observations  15,654  Rho (S.E.) -0.1783 (0.0643) 
Censored Observations  9,837  Log Likelihood -5961.65 
Wald Chi2 Test  Wald Chi2 (19) = 288.07;  Prob > Chi2 =0.0000 
LR Test of Independence of the Two Equations  Chi2 (1) = 7.85 ;  Prob > Chi2 =0.0051 
Notes:  *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1% level or better, ** at the 5% level or better and *at the 
10% level or better.  In addition to a constant, the employment regression includes regional dummies of the U.S. state 
where they last migrated and the migration regression includes regional dummies of the place of interview in Mexico.  
Omitted categories in the employment regression: Legal migrants, migrants lacking weak ties, migrants lacking strong 
ties, female migrants, migrants who were not married, migrants who did not speak English, migrants who did not own 
any assets before migrating, migrants who last migrated to the U.S. from 1990 onwards.  Omitted variables are defined 
similarly in the migration regression, although referred to the year before the first migration ever took place or to the 
survey date if the individual never migrated to the U.S.   38   
Table 7 
OLS Estimates of the Real Hourly Wages During Their Last U.S. Trip 
 
Variables Coefficients  Robust  S.E. 
Unauthorized During Last U.S. Migration  0.0197  0.0320 
Weak ties During Last U.S. Migration  0.0053***  0.0007 
Unauthorized*Weak ties  -0.0007  0.0010 
Strong ties During Last U.S. Migration  0.0252*** 0.0115 
Unauthorized*Strong ties  0.0053  0.0148 
Male 0.2601***  0.0801 
Age at Last U.S. Migration  -0.0032**  0.0013 
Years of Education at Last U.S. Migration  0.0191***  0.0035 
Spoke English at Last U.S. Migration  0.1797*** 0.0290 
Professional at Last U.S. Migration  0.2691** 0.1317 
Technical Worker at Last U.S. Migration  0.3331  0.2172 
Agricultural Worker at Last U.S. Migration  -0.0121 0.0325 
Manufacturing Worker at Last U.S. Migration  0.1858***  0.0291 
U.S. Cumulative Work Experience at Last U.S. Migration  0.0008*** 0.0002 
Duration of Last Trip to the U.S.  0.0036***  0.0002 
Last Migrated to the U.S. Before 1940  -0.1857 0.1632 
Last Migrated to the U.S. During the 1940s  0.0452 0.0732 
Last Migrated to the U.S. During the 1950s  0.0362 0.0513 
Last Migrated to the U.S. During the 1960s  0.2428*** 0.0458 
Last Migrated to the U.S. During the 1970s  0.2904***  0.0354 
Last Migrated to the U.S. During the 1980s  0.0476* 0.0287 
λ From Migration Equation  -0.2036***  0.0320 
λ From Work Equation  0.3894  0.1867 
Regression Fit Statistics   
Number of Observations  5,626 
F-statistic 45.68 
Prob > F  0.0000 
Adjusted R
2 0.2365 
Notes:  *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1% level or better, **signifies statistically 
different from zero at the 5% level or better and *signifies statistically different from zero at the 10% level 
or better.  The regression includes a constant.  Omitted categories: Legal migrants, migrants lacking weak 
ties, migrants lacking strong ties, migrants who did not speak English, migrants in service related 
occupations, and migrants who last migrated to the U.S. from 1990 onwards. 39  
Table 8 
Effects of Weak and Social Networks on the Employment and Real Hourly Wages of Immigrants by Their Legal Status 
 











Panel A: Unauthorized Immigrants           
With vs. Without Weak ties 
3 2 β β +   -0.0013 0.95 -0.0001  0.0047*** 40.16 
With vs. Without Strong ties 
5 4 β β +   -0.0447*** 8.92  -0.0047 0.0305***  9.17 
With vs. Without Weak and Strong ties 
5 4 3 2 β β β β + + +   -0.0460** 10.17  -0.0048 0.0352***  12.23 
Panel B: Legal Immigrants          
With vs. Without Weak ties 
2 β   0.0015 0.51 0.0002  0.0053*** 53.19 
With vs. Without Strong ties 
4 β   -0.0642*** 6.90  -0.0068 0.0252**  4.76 
With vs. Without Weak and Strong ties 
4 2 β β +   -0.0627** 7.48  -0.0066  0.0305***  6.96 
Panel C: Unauthorized vs. Legal Immigrants          
No ties 
1 β   0.2527*** 8.15  0.0239  0.0197  0.38 
Weak ties 
3 1 β β +   0.2499*** 8.65  0.0236  0.0190  0.37 
Strong ties 
5 1 β β +   0.2722*** 10.88  0.0260  0.0250  0.64 
Weak and Strong ties 
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Description of Variables Used in the Analysis  
 
Variables Definition  Mean  S.D.
 
Dependent variables:       
Likelihood of Migrating to the U.S.  Dummy equal to 1 if household head ever migrated to 
the U.S.  0.3703 0.4829 
Likelihood of Working During Last U.S. 
Migration  
For those who migrated to the U.S., dummy equal to 
1 if household head worked during last U.S. 
migration   0.9799  0.1404 
Real Hourly Wage During Lat U.S. 
Migration  
For those who have migrated to the U.S. and worked 
during their last U.S. migration, their real hourly 
wage during that period  1.5687  0.7479 
Independent variables:      
Unauthorized During Last U.S. Migration   Dummy equal to 1 if migrant was unauthorized 
during last U.S. migration  0.2186 0.4133 
Weak ties During Last U.S. Migration   Dummy equal to 1 if migrant had any distant relative 
or friend living in the U.S. as of the year prior to the 
last migration  0.1741  0.3792 
Strong ties During Last U.S. Migration  Dummy equal to 1 if migrant had any household 
member living in the U.S. as of the year prior to the 
last migration  0.1047  0.3062 
Size of Weak ties During Last U.S. 
Migration  
For immigrants with weak ties, the number of distant 
relatives and friends living in the U.S. as of the year 
prior to the last migration  10.89  15.82 
Size Strong ties During Last U.S. 
Migration 
For immigrants with strong ties, the number of 
household members living in the U.S. as of the year 
prior to the last migration  2.48  1.95 
Male  Gender dummy  0.8679 0.3386 
Age at Last U.S. Migration  Household head’s age at last U.S. migration  33.1465 12.0316 
Married at Last U.S. Migration  Dummy equal to 1 if immigrant was married at last 
U.S. migration  0.0151  0.1218 
Dependents at Last U.S. Migration  Number of minor children at last U.S. migration  2.2697 2.3094 
Years of Education at Last U.S. Migration  Years of educational attainment at last U.S. migration   5.0260 3.9167 
Spoke English at Last U.S. Migration  Dummy equal to 1 if immigrant spoke English at last 
U.S. migration  0.0918  0.2887 
Professional at Last U.S. Migration   Occupation dummy at last U.S. migration  0.0024 0.0492 
Technical Worker at Last U.S. Migration   Occupation dummy at last U.S. migration  0.0009 0.0295 
Agricultural Worker at Last U.S. Migration  Occupation dummy at last U.S. migration  0.1381 0.3450 
Manufacturing Worker at Last U.S. 
Migration 
Occupation dummy at last U.S. migration 
0.1313 0.3377 
Service Worker at Last U.S. Migration  Occupation dummy at last U.S. migration  0.0706 0.2562 
U.S. Cumulative Work Experience at Last 
U.S. Migration 
U.S. cumulative work experience at last U.S. 
migration in months  44.0837  62.3951 
Owned Any Assets Before First Migration 
or at Survey Date 
Dummy equal to 1 if household head had any assets 
before the first U.S. migration or at survey date  0.1925 0.3943 
Duration of Last Trip to the U.S.  Duration of last U.S. trip in months  35.9300 70.3696 
Last Migrated to the U.S. Before 1940 
 
Dummy equal to 1 if migration took place before 
1940 0.0023  0.0479 41   
Table A – Continued 
 
Variables Definition  Mean  S.D.
 
Last Migrated to the U.S. During the 
1940s  Dummy equal to 1 if migration took place during the 1940s  0.0099 0.0990 
Last Migrated to the U.S. During the 
1950s 
Dummy equal to 1 if migration took place during the 1950s 
0.0272 0.1627 
Last Migrated to the U.S. During the 
1960s 
Dummy equal to 1 if migration took place during the 1960s 
0.0338 0.1807 
Last Migrated to the U.S. During the 
1970s 
Dummy equal to 1 if migration took place during the 1970s 
0.0637 0.2442 
Last Migrated to the U.S. During the 
1980s 
Dummy equal to 1 if migration took place during the 1980s 
0.1159 0.3201 
Last Migrated to the U.S. from 1990 
Onwards 
Dummy equal to 1 if migration took place during from 
1990s onwards  0.7472  0.4346 
Age at First Migration or at Survey 
Date 
Household head’s age at first U.S. migration or at survey 
date  39.3873 17.3598 
Married at First Migration or at 
Survey Date 
Dummy equal to 1 if immigrant was married at first U.S. 
migration or at survey date  0.0619  0.2409 
Dependents at First Migration or at 
Survey Date 
Number of minor children at first U.S. migration or at 
survey date  1.6696  1.9869 
Number of Family Members with 
U.S. Migration Experience 
Number of family members with U.S. migration experience 
at first U.S. migration or at survey date  0.7300 1.3272 
Years of Education at First 
Migration or at Survey Date 
Years of educational attainment at first U.S. migration or at 
survey date  5.5536  4.4929 
Employed Before First Migration or 
at Survey Date 
Dummy equal to 1 if household head was employed before 
ever migrating to the U.S. or as of the survey date  0.8479  0.3591 
Owned Any Assets Before First 
Migration or at Survey Date 
Dummy equal to 1 if household head had any assets before 
ever migrating to the U.S. or as of the survey date  0.6151 0.4866 
Source: Mexican Migration Project (MMP93).     
 
 